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nyone who has glanced at the reading material of small children
is familiar with riddles like these : "What is white when it's
dirty and black when it's clean?" "What gets wetter and wetter
the more it dries?" "What is the surest way to keep fish from smelling?" Most children's riddles intrigue (adults as well as children), but
usually only for a short time. Once the answer is provided, the puzzle
is solved by exposing the anomaly or odd use of words or general trick
on which the riddle is formed.
Riddles for some are veridical paradoxes for others. What is puzzling
in a riddle may be an apparent paradox resolved by introducing a hidden or more general truth. For example, the true description of a man
as being 21 years old yet having had only five birthdays is explained
by the fact that he was born in a leap year on February 29th. A more
pernicious puzzlement is found in falsidical paradoxes. Here the puzzlement is genuine, but the paradox is not. It is exposed by exhibiting
the error on which it is based . For example, logicians now agree that
Zeno's paradox of the tortoise and the hare, though a source of puzzlement (and pleasure to hairsplitters) for centuries, is based on the fallacy
of supposing that an infinite succession of intervals must add up to an
infinite interval.
The tougher, and thus more interesting, sources of puzzlement are
the genuine paradoxes. The famous paradox of Epimenides- "All
Cretans are liars," uttered by a Cretan (or, more generally, "I am lying
now")-and Godel's theorem are two examples of self-referential
paradoxes. They seem to circle back on themselves, creating a contradiction by the maintenance of rules and arguments that , taken singly, are
impeccable . The paradox known as Newcomb's problem, though not
self-referential, is created by the "pull" of two decision rules. (See Appendix 1.) A genuine paradox seems to force us in two directions at
once when we cannot go in both directions or even in one direction
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so long as the rules and conditions of the paradox are maintained. In
simplest terms, a genuine paradox is a self-contradiction from valid rules
and acceptable premises.
Genuine paradoxes still can be managed. They cannot be "solved"
like veridical paradoxes, or "exposed" like falsidical ones, but strategies
of accommodation are available. Look again at the paradox of
Epimenides. One familiar approach to the liar paradox is to avoid it
by introducing a hierarchy of truth locutions. True and false can be
indicated with numerical subscripts denoting the location of staten~ents
in a matrix of true-false types-Quine's solution. 1 We might say, {or
example, it is true 1 that I am telling the truth when I say "I am now
not telling the truth 0 .'' The paradox is avoided with the recognition
of a type of truth function (subscript 1) that can address the truth of
other statements (subscript 0)-an arrangement of language familiar
to students of the sociology of knowledge, where claims within social
practices are judged by truth criteria from outside those practices. The
familiar dichotomy in the social sciences between "participant" and
"observer" is basically the acceptance of terms for subscripts representing hierarchies of truth locutions .
Scientific anomalies present more complex strategies of resolution for
puzzling events. A recent experiment in physics fires subatomic particles through a slit on a screen. The resulting distribution of particles
is influenced by whether another slit on the screen, causally independent of the particles, is open or shut. 2 This seeming violation of
causality raises questions (as such tests always do) about the retentive
power of basic concepts and the validity of critical tests. Some propose
replacing classical logic with some new logic accommodating quantum
physics. 3 Others maintain that logic is necessary to criticize a theory
and subject it to falsification tests. 4 In all cases of scientific anomaly,
pressures are strong to explain the events empirically. Test conditions
may be discredited. Auxiliary hypotheses are offered to save important
theoretical principles (an offering some see as preventing falsification) . 5
Failure to accommodate the anomaly inevitably creates additional
pressures to change some parts of the theory while maintaining basic
principles. Perhaps the basic principles must give way to a new
paradigm.6
Game theory and collective choice, though no threats to understandings of physical reality, introduce anomalies to recent comprehensions
of a political society. Both of these fields are inventions (largely) of the
twentieth century. Game theory was devised by a mathematician, John
von Neumann. Collective choice theory, though found in inchoate form
in the writing of Condorcet in the eighteenth century and Charles
Dodgson in the nineteenth, begins its contemporary incarnation with
the work of Duncan Black and Kenneth Arrow. 7 Both fields teach us
that what counts as a rational choice for any individual is critically affected by how others choose. But it is yet another contribution that
I will be concerned with here: the demonstration in both fields that
a collection of individual choices can be irrational even when every individual in the collection is choosing rationally. A rational inconsistency
between individual and collective is obviously no dilemma comparable
to those found today in physics . It is not certain that such rational
breakdowns are even genuine paradoxes. Nor is a conflict between individual and collective a dilemma for types of holism . 8 But rational
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1. W. V. 0. Quine, The Ways of
Paradox (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), where
the distinction berween
"veridical" and "falsidical"
paradoxes is also found. One can
also change the reference to avoid
self-referential paradoxes , as when
a non-Cretan says " All Cretans are
liars. ' ' But rwo different people
uttering the same sentence may be
expressing different propositions.
For a discussion of semantic
paradoxes , see James Cargile ,

Paradoxes: A Study in Form and
Predication (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press , 1979).
2. The speculative discussion of
this experiment has even challenged , on the basis of quantum
physics, the doctrine of a real
world independent of human consciousness. For a nontechnical overview , see Bernard d'Espagnat,
" The Quantum Theory and Reality, " Scientific American 241
(November 1979): 158-81.
3. Hilary Putnam , " Is Logic Empirical? " in Proceedings of the
Boston Colloquium for Philosophy
of Science , Boston Studies in the
Phtiosophy of Science, vol. 5, ed.
R. Cohen and M. Wartofsky (Dordrecht: Reidel , 1969).
4. Karl Popper, Objective
Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1972}.
5. I. Lakatos , "Falsification and
the Methodology of Scientific
Research Programmes," in

Cn'ticism and the Growth of
Knowledge , ed. I. Lakatos and A.
Musgrave (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1970}.
6. Thomas Kuhn , The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press , 1962}.
7. Black, The Theory of Commit·
tees and Elections (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press , 1958}.
Arrow, Social Choice and In dividual Values (New York: Wiley,
1963).
8. Individuals in corporate wholes
who oppose collective outcomes are
simply irrational-a pattern of
judgment found in the idealistic
political philosophies of Plato and
Hegel. Collectivist theories in
general do not suppose that
societies are rational in the same
way that individuals are rational.
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9. A collection of readings and
text on these representations is Rational Man and Irrational Society ?
ed. Brian Barry and Russell Hardin
(Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage
Publications, 1982). See also the
overview by Dennis Mueller,
Public Choice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

MORALITY-?

discontinuity is an anomaly for methodological individualism, the
philosophy guiding game theory and collective choice. If we believe
(as most Western social scientists believe) that society is no more and
no less than a collection of individuals, it is a puzzle of some importance that society can fail tests of rationality passed by every individual
constituting the society.
An enormous and expanding body of work has explored the resolutions and implications of these rational conflicts between one and all.9
But it is still not clear exactly what concepts can be maintained and
what must be jettisoned in avoiding these conflicts . My objective here
is reasonably modest. I will examine two types of rational breakdown
between individual and society-the problems demonstrated in Kenneth
Arrow's impossibility theorem and those found in exchanges of goods.
My goal is to establish that collective choice theory relies on a number
of background concepts that are not recognized in the formal delineations of the theory. These concepts combine with the explicit conditions and axioms of collective choice to produce competing senses of
equality and an ambivalent status for the term "individual" -and these
problems of equality and individualism explain the rational breakdowns
in collective choice theory. Indeed, two concepts of community can
be found in collective choice. These two communities originate in
conflicts between background moral concepts and the more straightforward arithmetical languages of collective choice. In disclosing these
two communities, moreover, one gains an understanding both of the
liberal assumptions of collective choice theory and of some conflicts
within liberalism itself.

Liberal communities

Published by SURFACE, 1985

The high standing of methodological individualism in collective
choice is celebrated throughout Arrow's theorem. The starting conditions of the original proof require discrete (nonoverlapping) individuals.
The collective , in turn, is a combination of separate orderings. Indeed,
Arrow extends a tradition of thought which assumes that the definitive
question in collective choice is how to aggregate the values of separate
individuals to reach a collective outcome . The theorem develops a rational breakdown between individual and whole that questions this
tradition and the influence of methodological individualism on collective choice.
The intriguing hold that Arrow's theorem has on us begins with logic.
We first ponder orderings like these : voter 1 ranks three alternatives
a > b > c; voter 2 ranks the same alternatives b > c > a; and a third
voter orders the alternatives c > a > b. If these three rankings are combined, an intransitive ordering is the result: a > b, b > c, and c >
a. The trap is thus set by the famous cyclical majority. We are drawn
further into it by Arrow's general theorem. The basic theorem proves
that when there are more than three individuals and alternatives, there
does not exist any social choice function (or aggregator) that satisfies Pareto,
nondictatorship, universal domain, complete and transitive rationality,
and the independence of irrelevant alternatives . (See Appendix 2.)
The proofs of the theorem demonstrate how these conditions are incompatible . The most common proof is to suppose that there is a set of
individuals decisive over two alternatives, x > y. By universal domain,
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then, both x > y > z andy > z > x must be admissible orderings.
Now x > y on decisiveness, y > z on Pareto, and, on transitivity,
x > z follows . The members of the decisive set prefer x > z, and so
the decisiveness over x > y has spread to x > z by virtue of Pareto
and transitivity. This contagion effect of decisiveness can be extended
to all pairs of alternatives, demonstrating that local decisiveness (over
any pair of alternatives) becomes global decisiveness (over all pairs of
alternatives) when Arrow's conditions are maintained. Further, there
must always be a decisive set if there is anything short of unanimity
in society and society selects (on whatever rule) some ordering over
others. For example, if set 1 prefers x > y > z, set 2 prefers y > z
> x, and set 3 prefers z > x > y (the cyclical-majority orderings), majority rule selects y > z. Sets 1 and 2 then constitute a set decisive over
set 3 and the contagion effect reoccurs. The upshot of the proof is that
a society cannot make any collective decisions when global unanimity
is absent without either dismissing Arrow's conditions or violating them.
The formal nature of the theorem seems at the outset cause for
celebration (assuming that the nonspecialist maintains sanity). One of
the attractive features of formal theory is that conditions and axioms
are stated explicitly and relationships among basic concepts are
demonstrated . The explicit and demonstrable nature of such theorizing provides a clarity and generality of thought that can extend from
one level of theory to another, and even among substantive areas sharing
the same abstract calculus. But formal theory succeeds only if all of the
terms needed to understand a problem are disclosed; and it is by no
means certain that the most important conditions, axioms, and relationships are treated in Arrow's proof. If one inspects a deeper layer
of assumptions, a different and more general set of components can
be uncovered and used to demonstrate conflicts of a different order.
These conflicts, moreover, may require languages that do not meet the
requirements of formal systems.
One background set of assumptions in Arrow's theorem, for example, defines a liberal model of a political society: individuals are (a)
moral equals who are (b) separate from one another and (c) free to pursue their own goals without institutional impediments or interference
by others. Yet only the second and third of these three features of
liberalism are explicit in the theorem . The first-moral equality-must
be inferred from the formal conditions of the proof. If one began and
ended an understanding of Arrow's theorem with the surface conditions and axioms, moral equality would never be encountered. Yet the
concept of moral equality helps us understand both the logic and the
meaning of the theorem as an exercise in social theory .
One indication that there is a deeper layer of concepts in Arrow's
theorem is that the demonstration of the problem is not completely
describable in logical or rational terms. Three of Arrow's original five
conditions are influenced by moral or equity concepts: Pareto, nondictatorship, and universal domain . Each of these three conditions is an
effort to fulfill autonomy: Pareto in ensuring that unanimity will be
represented at the collective level, nondictatorship in ruling out the
dominance of one over all, and universal domain in prohibiting the
manipulation of alternatives . If moral concerns are dismissed, no rational problem occurs in the theorem; for transitivity and the independence condition can be satisfied with a violation of any one of
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10. John Rawls, A Theory of
justice (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard
University Press, 1971). Robert
Nozick, Anarchy, State, and
Utopia (New York: Basic Books,
1974).

MORALITY -9

the three equity conditions .
The moral concerns of Arrow's theorem define a common grid on
which are found a number of theories that appear disparate and even
contradictory on the surface . Both John Rawls's theory of justice and
Robert Nozick's libertarian state share the same liberal model underlying Arrow's theorem . Rawls's principles of justice are drawn from the
hypothetical choices of individuals in liberal conditions (equal regard,
liberty , rationality). Nozick's account of justice begins with a liberal
vision of free and (initially) equal individuals each invested with rights
that protect autonomy . 10 What is especially intriguing about these
three theories is that each is an attempt to reconcile the moral concepts
and radical individualism of liberal theory. The two theories that reach
collective outcomes by adding individual values fail consistency tests
(Arrow's and Nozick 's) . The one that transforms all into everyone (a
holistic noun) remains internally consistent (Rawls's) . The more interesting observation , however, is that a general understanding of collective choice is gained by exploring the liberal model as it strains to
accommodate arithmetic. Since collective choice produces conflicts between individual and social rationality only on the premise that individuals are moral equals free to set their own goals, an inspection
of the liberal model should identify in a more general way what concepts must be modified to avoid contradictions in collective choice .

Equality in collective choice
The surface, or explicit, axioms and conditions of Arrow's theorem
tolerate many forms of inequality . Entries to the aggregation machine
(any device for aggregating preferences) can be counted more than once,
so that a social state in which one individual has , say, one hundred
votes and another only one vote is not ruled out by Arrow's theorem .
Also, the individual actors , though required by the conditions to be
discrete , do not have to be singletons. They can be sets, collectives,
blocs, lumps, whatever. Both United Technologies and an individual
citizen of an upstate New York village can be individual actors in the
theorem .
The theorem is also silent on any number of other equality measures
and criteria. The ratio of participants (those individuals introducing
preferences to the aggregation machine) to nonparticipants is not an
issue in Arrow's theorem . So, like Aristotle's views on citizenship, exclusionary rules may keep most individuals from participating; and
whatever equality exists among individuals in an Arrow society (and
in an Aristotelian one) may apply only to a very small subset of individuals . The theorem also says nothing about equality within sets or
blocs , so that even if the actors in Arrow's theorem are in some way
equal, the members of such units may be unequal to each other and
to members of other units. The absence of overlap among actors reinforces whatever inequalities may exist within units , for the possibility
of multiple memberships vitiates the more extreme effects of inequality within collectives (allowing individuals to be unequal in one setting
while equal in another-as church vicars may find themselves low on
the club tennis ladder) . Finally, all but one of the theorem's conditions permit inequalities in the distribution of goods (nondictatorship,
see below, is the exception) . Pareto, for example, is a concept used by
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Arrow mainly as a device to guarantee that unanimity will be honored.
But the concept itself does not require any distributive equality. 11 If
equality is to be found in Arrow's theorem, it must be located in the
context of an assemblage of concepts that, on the whole, tolerate a
variety of inequalities.
The presence of a concept of equality is suggested by the strong
evaluative language in which many of the rational problems of collective choice are typically described. The "free rider," for example, is
an individual who benefits from the collective production of public
goods without contributing to the collective effort. The phrase ''free
rider'' suggests the stigma that helps form the rational problem. A free
rider is a cheat, someone who gets something he doesn't earn. In broader
terms, an individual who fails to contribute to a cooperative enterprise
in which he is a member does not meet minimal tests of fairness . The
free rider is someone who ought to contribute but does not and as a
noncontributing member, the free rider is a moral as well as a rational
failure. The individual who deserves the public good without
contribution-the very ill or the very young, for example-is not a free
rider. The rational problem of suboptimal provisions of public goods
would look entirely different if noncontributors were justly excused from
group participation. In Prisoners' Dilemma, a famous game in which
players who choose rationally find that the combination of their choices
is subrational, the cell in which one individual secures optimal returns
at the expense of the other player is routinely labeled the ''exploitive''
cell or the "sucker" outcome. Arrow employs evaluative language in
an even stronger and more explicit sense: the decisive set consisting of
a singleton is a ''dictator,'' one whose orderings are the orderings of all.

11. Imagine a graph. Choose any
two numbers , say 2, 1, to mark a
point on the graph . The area
Pareto superior to this point is any
point in the upper right-hand
quadrant of the graph greater than
2,!. The numbers in this space can
be radically unequal, e.g. , 900,3.

M

uch of the evaluative language in collective choice is of course
window dressing, except for Arrow's explicit use of the
nondictatorship condition. But the language is still formed by
expectations that collective outcomes must fulfill Aristotle's definition
of numerical equality as equal shares to and from all relevant individuals;
for none of the rational problems is represented by a canon of claims
that might rank individual claims on, and obligations to, collective action in some distributive pattern. Instead, unequal outcomes, by virtue of being unequal, are viewed as failures of collective action. The
free rider, the nonvoter, the exploitive cell, and Arrow's dictator are
regarded as pathologies of collective choice . Now it is an axiom of
equality that inequalities in the social unit may be needed to ensure
equalities among individuals. If, for example, patient 1 needs 3 units
of an antibiotic for a restoration of health and patient 2 needs 5 units
to achieve the same result, then, in the table below,
1

2

a

3

3

b

3

5

social state b is a more authentic expression of equal treatment of patients 1 and 2 than is social state a. 12 Arrow's theorem, in contrast,
looks only to collective outcomes, not to the differences that may obtain among individuals. A theory that views inequalities of outcomes
as ipso facto unsatisfactory must assume that the individuals produc-
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12. Or, individuals sometimes
have to be treated differently in
order to be treated equally.
Douglas Rae, Equalities (Cambridge , Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1981). See also the discussion by Felix Oppenheim ,
' 'Egalitarian Rules of Distribution ," Ethics 90 Uanuary 1980):
164-79 .
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13. I will sternly resist walking
readers through the exercises proving this point (on the advice of
the editors) and instead simply say
that the point can be found in Arrow's Social Choice and numerous
secondary sources. I have found
especially helpful on this (and
other pares of Arrow's proof) Jerry
Kelly 's ATTOw Impossibility
Theorems (New York: Academic
Press, 1978).

14. See Dennis C. Mueller, Public
Choice (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1979), chap. 14,
for an overview discussion.
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ing and consuming the outcomes are equal. Or, above, if a is preferable
to b, 1 and 2 must be equal in their claims (effect, need, desert, etc.)
on the shares distributed.
The assumption of equal individuals, however, proceeds with no information about individuals, except that they are countable units. No
interpersonal value comparisons are conducted (except at a late point
in the development of Arrow's theorem , and then with "extended sympathy''). No theory of justice is developed to evaluate individual claims.
But the acceptance of equal distributions requires the assumption that
individuals have equal claims on joint outcomes.
The logic of the nondictatorship condition in Arrow's theorem supports equality of claims and requires equality of effect. The condition
rules out a decisive set, which means only that no individual's ordering
can be the ordering for all others in the society. The question is, why
not? An individual endorsing a more just social distribution can dictate legitimately to others without being a dictator. A judge (in a nonjury trial) can dictate the outcome of court proceedings. Decisiveness
as such can be denied only on the assumption that no individual is an
authority over all others. Again, equality of claims must be a background
concept.
But the point can be taken further . Arrow's theorem proves that local
decisiveness is contagious. If a set S of individuals is locally decisive for
x against y, then with Arrow's conditions, that set is also globally decisive
for x against y. Or if any individual, i, dictates on some pair of alternatives , that individual i is decisive for any pair of alternatives . 13 Thus
any inequality of effect spreads to dictatorship . Arrow's individuals must
all be equal to one another; for if any one is decisive over any other
on a single pair of alternatives, that decisiveness extends logically to
global decisiveness (or dictatorship as decisiveness over all pairs of alternatives). Nondictatorship is a condition assigned to collective outcomes,
and the condition depends on a moral equality (equal claims, equal
effects) among individuals.
The two equality assumptions-equal effects and equal claims-are
contained in the thought that collective choice theories assume that
justice is settled prior to the stage of decision making. 14 Usually the
prior settlement involves equity expectations that preferences will be
revealed successfully in the rules chosen for decision making. Arrow's
theorem represents a breakdown in these expectations. But, also, the
two equality assumptions reveal substantive expectations that explain
in large measure why the breakdowns occur-because equality assumptions rule out dominance patterns. Note that nothing in the theorem
prohibits a distribution of goods or resources in the collective outcome.
It is simply that arithmetical composition rules provide no criteria for
arriving at distributions. The background moral equality of the theorem
can tolerate and even justify distributional inequality if used within some
theory of justice. But Arrow's theorem, containing no criteria for fair
or just distributions, can only move between absolute numerical equality
and absolute inequality (or dictatorship) with no capacity for occupying any intermediate position between these two extremes . And it is
precisely this absence of any device to rank claims that compels the
theorem to regard individuals as absolutely equal.
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Arrow and Rawls
In its reliance on equality as a background concept, Arrow's theorem
is similar to Rawls's theory of justice. The theorem and the theory are
of course unlike one another in several important ways. Arrow's starting conditions of choice contain discrete and countable individuals who
have ordinary knowledge about themselves (their abilities, needs, interests) and their probable locations in a collective outcome. Rawls's
individuals, however, choose governing principles in an original position (OP) where they are denied knowledge of their assets and liabilities,
their locations in the social practice formed by the governing principles,
and a theory of the good. One effect of this veil of ignorance is to suspend that information which ordinarily allows individuals to demarcate themselves from others . Rawls's OP individuals are not discrete
and countable, for each is identical to every other. (One is equivalent
to everyone.) A second effect of the veil is to set aside aggregation. Arrow's individuals express preferences that are combined by means of
arithmetical composition rules. Individuals in the OP have preferences
(for distributive principles) that are logically unanimous. The two principles of justice in Rawls's theory-liberty and equal opportunity conjoined with the difference principle-are composed or logically derived
from the conditions of the OP. They are not produced from
aggregation . 15
Nor is it clear that the rules governing individual preferences and
collective outcomes are congenial in each case. Arrow's five conditions
and three axioms (completeness, transitivity, and rationality) fit Rawls's
OP only in part. One condition-universal domain-is comfortably
joined to Rawls's theory. Individuals in the OP can survey all logically
possible distributive principles (including those of utilitarianism) without
any restrictions (except those built into the features of rational choice
in the OP-which point can be directed against any conditions in rational choice) . The domain of social choice may then be seen as consisting of every logically possible combination of individual orderings
of the alternatives surveyed (thus satisfying universal domain) . Two of
the other three conditions, however, do not bear on the OP. Pareto
and nondictatorship are useless when applied to the conditions of the
OP, for each requires more than one discrete individual for its primary
effect. Where, as in the OP, individuals are not rationally distinguishable and, as a consequence, unanimity is logically assured,
Pareto and nondictatorship are worthless standards. 16 The independence of irrelevant alternatives, however, is important. It is always
worthwhile to ensure that collective choices will not vary on static
preferences, even when outcomes are derived rather than aggregated. 17
One axiom of individual choice-binary comparisons-is not used in
the OP. (Rawls allows global comparisons of principles.) The othertransitivity-is not mentioned in Rawls's account but can be reasonably
expected to apply to the means-ends deliberations he endorses.

B

ut, in spite of these disjunctures and only mild overlaps, a common set of assumptions is shared by Arrow's theorem and
Rawls's theory of justice. These assumptions are disclosed in
an inspection of the deeper model of a political society in Rawls's method
of theorizing . Recall that intuitionism-the establishment of a rank
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15. Rawls, A Theory ofjustice.
The principles are produced from
a bargaining game in the first
model of justice, in Rawls's
"Justice as Fairness," in
Philosophy, Politics, and Society ,
2d ser., ed. Peter Lasslett and
W. G. Runciman (New York:
Barnes & Noble, 1962). But the
later amendments to this first
model bring out Kantian features
of the OP which make bargaining
inappropriate and indeed impossible. See Eric Von Magnus, "On
Modeling the Original Position ,"
Reason Papers 6 (Spring 1980):
25 - 35 .
16. The formal requirements of
Pareto and nondictatorship,
however, are satisfied with a single
individual. Pareto is met when x,
y E X (the set of all alternatives),
and the set of all N is decisive for
x > y. Nondictatorship states that
no individual is decisive for x
against y for all x, y E D (D =
profile). Now a set , 5, is decisive
for x against y (x, y E X) if, for
every profile Din which (1) x ~
1 y for all i E s, (2) x > 1 y for at
least one i E 5, we have (3) x E v
> y fl. Cu (v). So both Pareto
and nondictatorship formally apply
to a singleton set. But since Pareto
seeks to ensure that unanimity is
reflected in collective outcomes ,
and nondictatorship rules out a
single individual dominating all
others in the collective outcome ,
the use of each condition in
Rawls's OP would be otiose.

=

17. The independence condition
requires that two distinct profiles
whose restriction to an agenda are
the same must also have choice
functions that act the same , at
least on that agenda. Or, put less
formally , collective outcomes are to
remain the same if individual
orderings do not vary. Any theory
of collective choice that derives
principles from individual choices
would be concerned to ensure such
noncreativity of composition rules .
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18 . Ronald Dworkin , Taking
Rights Sen'ously (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press , 1978).

19. H. L. A. Han , " Are There
Any Natural Rights?"
Phtiosophical Review 64 ( 195 5 ):
175-91.

20. Brian Barry, The Liberal
Theory of}ustice (Oxford : Clarendon Press , 1973); Robert Paul
Wolff, Understanding Rawls
(Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1977).
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ordering of basic principles without benefit of publicly accessible criteria
for ranking-is abandoned by Rawls in favor of the social contract . Intuitionism (as in Plato's Republic) permits authoritative accounts of
political arrangements insulated from challenge by those who have not
had the critical intuitive experience or who do not have access to the
ranking criteria. Contract theory, on the other hand, presumes that individuals are equal in the formation and ranking of political principles.
The deep assumption in Rawls's theory, formed from his reliance on
contract theory, is that all individuals, regardless of their status , have
a right to be given an equal regard in the establishment of social
practices. 18
The assumption of rights to an equal regard is itself part of a larger
set of assumptions. Rights depend on critical separations among
individuals and between individuals and the political society. A
right, as traditionally understood , is not a constraint on the individual
to whom it is assigned; it is a constraint on others not to impede the
actions of the one who has the right. Thus a right to vote is a constraint
on registrars (and the like) that forbids interference with an individual's
effort to vote, but that does not require of the individual with the right
to vote that she do anything (even vote). Similarly, rights against the
state restrict the state from interfering in the areas protected by rights.
It follows that rights presume that individuals are separate and capable
of adversary relationships with each other and with the political society.
It also follows that freedom is assigned to individuals, for in the absence
of freedom there are no rights at all. 19
When this larger set of assumptions is described , we see more clearly
how the OP functions in Rawls 's theory. It is an intermediate device
that represents and transforms a model of discrete individuals into a
hypothetical community of identical rational agents. This hypothetical
community is a moral society that fulfills tests of fairness. These tests
(primarily impartiality) allow us to view the two derived principles as
principles of justice. That the derivation fails to produce a substantive
outcome from a formal procedure has been adequately documented . 20
The list of primary goods strongly biases the theory toward liberalism;
the ''general facts about society'' condition sets historical limits on the
generality of the theory. But this failure only reaffirms Hume's dictum
that nothing can be found in the conclusions of a deduction that is
not present in the premises. Once the deeper assumptions are produced,
the theory is properly seen as a reexpression of a liberal model filtered
through the mechanism of an OP . Nowhere is this implicit liberalism
clearer than in the derived principles of justice. Liberty is the first principle chosen, and it is shielded through a lexical ordering from economic
practices (set by the difference principle). This version of justice is as
strong a reexpression of the liberal ideal of a political society as one
is likely to find .

A
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rrow's theorem is also developed on a deep assumption of
equality, though the equality is more deeply embedded. The
possibility of contagion in decisiveness sets forth the strictest
type of equality of effect ; and both the general acceptance of equal
distributions and the denial of authoritative claims by means of nondictatorship require equality of claims. Liberal ideals of autonomy are
expressed by these conditions. Indeed , all four of Arrow's explicit
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conditions-universal domain, Pareto, nondictatorship, and the independence of irrelevant alternatives-are features of a liberal society.
They suggest a well-known account of autonomous individuals
originating social practices without constraints from any external source
(natural law, institutions, procedures, or other individuals).
A liberal society is developed on two distinct moral perspectives. 21
One is that the state must be neutral on the values that individuals
ascribe to their lives. Another is the view that all members of the political
society are to be given an equal regard, without reference to their circumstances. Though these two perspectives can lead to quite different
and frequently contrary conclusions on the proper role of the state in
regulating the lives of its citizens, both are congenially represented in
Arrow's equity conditions. The uses of universal domain and Pareto
express the first form of liberalism, neutrality. Universal domain in particular ensures state neutrality in the availability and ordering of alternatives. Pareto grants legitimacy to those alternatives, and only those
alternatives, that have unanimous support from individuals (not support from the state). Both conditions depend on a standard justification for state neutrality: a noncognitive theory of value. Any theory
of value that ranks moral principles or statements on truth criteria would
immediately (a) dismiss universal domain by restricting the range of
acceptable alternatives for individuals to order, and (b) address Pareto
from the perspective of a critical morality that would not necessarily
accept unanimity as the satisfaction of moral demands. 22 The current
labeling of preferences as "tastes" 23 is thus no mere convenience but
an expression of the belief that values make no truth claims. In the
absence of a noncognitive theory of value Arrow's theorem could not
be developed. But the other moral perspective on liberalism is also
represented in the theorem. Nondictatorship sets up a procedural condition that expresses, through a logical guatantee, the thought that each
individual is to be given an equal regard in, and even have an equal
effect on, the collective outcomes of society. Taken together, these two
moral perspectives amount to the more complex liberal view that individuals are self-legislating creatures who are morally equal to one
another, and that the political society in some way originates in the
expressed preferences of these individuals.
The complex liberal view begins to break down in Arrow's theorem
with the use of arithmetical methods to reach collective outcomes. The
methods are justified by the individualism ofliberal theory. "Counting
heads'' is a way of ensuring that social practices originate with the
descriptions of individuals. This individualism is elaborated in the
philosophy of methodological individualism-wholes are arithmetical
compositions of, and reducible to, their parts. Two features of Arrow's
theorem represent this philosophy. The first is the separate and countable status of individuals. Atomism is not too strong a metaphor. Individuals are not, as in Aristotle's polis, conceptually embedded in the
political society. Nor is society temporally or conceptually prior to the
individual. The opposite is assumed: individuals are the independent
variables from which social states ate derived. The second feature, complementing the first, is that collective outcomes are no more and no
less than the atithmetical sum of individual orderings (a requirement
finding one expression in the independence condition). Nothing is to
emerge in the collective outcome that is not present in the constituent
parts.
https://surface.syr.edu/suscholar/vol6/iss1/2

21. Ronald Dworkin,
"Liberalism ," in Publtc and
Private Morality , ed. Stuart Hampshire (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1978).

22. I. M. D. Little, "Social Choice
and Individual Values," journal of
Polittcal Economy 60 (October
1952): 422-32.
23. William H. Riker , Liberalism
against Populism (San Francisco:
W. H. Freeman, 1982).
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Rawls's theory, however, is closer to meeting the condition of
nonemergence than is Arrow's theorem . Rawls's early work attempted
to produce more than the premises allowed-substantive principles from
formal procedures. His later, more developed theory of justice introduced substantive conditions to the procedures of choice (e.g., primary
goods, the general facts about society) that are necessary if the principles of justice are to be derived, but that nonetheless compromise the
effort to maintain the procedures as purely formal devices. The full
theory was presented as a general theory of justice. But liberal principles appear in the premises and make their way through the filter
of the OP to emerge as (justified) principles of justice. Everything that
emerges in Rawls's theory is present in the premises, and the assumptions become principles that are consistent with procedure once the
liberal status of the theory is acknowledged. Arrow's assumptions, in
contrast, lead to emergents that are self-contradictory: the collective state
does not successfully represent individual values. The different methods
employed in each approach to collective choice explain the different
outcomes. Rawls mediates the arithmetical language of liberalism with
a Kantian representation of equal regard . The OP reconciles the atomism
of liberalism with its moral needs, ensuring equal regard not through
the requirements of methodological individualism, but by means of
that collective state formed by the veil of ignorance. Arrow's theorem,
in contrast, tries to produce a collective state by arithmetical meansaggregation of separate preferences. The effort fails to meet its own conditions for success.

T

24. See Robert Nozick's examples
and discussion in Anarchy, State,
and Utopia, pp. 93- 94, where he
develops the modest point that the
benefits of collective action to an
individual must be more than his
own calculated costs in contributing (in order for fairness to
apply), pp. 267 - 68 for a
recognition that some may
legitimately refuse to contribute
even if all others give to collective
action (" they don't care about the
ride at all").
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he contradictions of Arrow's theorem, however, do not occur
within the set of arithmetical assumptions . The production of,
say, a non transitive ordering from a collection of transitive
orderings is logically intriguing. But such events are natural features
of arithmetic and logic and often avoidable with extension or manipulation of the formal systems. In Arrow's theorem, for example, a decisive
set satisfies transitivity at the collective level. Rational problems occur
only if the theorem is viewed as a representation of social conflict and
allocation. The representation must stand for outcomes that are (in
Rawls's phrase) "burdens and benefits" to members of society.
Such representations are indeed found in collective choice. Look again
at the free rider problem. Imagine a group of individuals who cooperate
to produce some collective good-musicians, say, who voluntarily provide a concert every Sunday for the neighborhood. If some individuals
take up a collection to help the musicians with expenses, contributions
would be nice but could not be obligatory even for those who live close
enough to the site of the concerts to hear the music without any effort.
The concert is produced without benefit of a collective agreement , explicit or tacit. If an individual has not consented to a joint effort, and
indeed does not care if the good is provided or not, the evaluative force
of the phrase ''free rider'' and the logic of the free rider argument are
meaningless. A fairness principle is needed for the free rider argument,
and a cooperative community is needed for the principle. If all have
consented to a jointly beneficial project, each person has a reason to
cooperate. In the absence of a consensual community and the sense of
fairness drawn from it, the formal proof of the free rider dilemma cannot be developed. 24
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Arrow's conditions require a similar sense of community. Nondictatorship suggests that the community must be a moral community.
Unless individuals are taken to be moral agents, the dominance of one
over all is not describable as dictatorship. Imagine a faulty roulette wheel
that always produces the same number, ensuring the dominance of that
number over all the others on the wheel. If the wheel is demonstrated
as a curiosity, we would not say that such numerical decisiveness is dictatorship. Dictatorship is the way we would describe the use of the wheel
by a flawed dealer to dominate other (human) gamblers by taking their
money. Or imagine a decisive star, one whose luminosity is so bright
as to render all rivals practically invisible . Or think of a decisive solution to a mathematical problem, or a decisive experiment in science .
None of these are dictatorial events. Nondictatorship is a condition that
rules out the dominance of one agent over all other agents, a dominance
that is without reason or agreement from those dominated.
The two other equity conditions support this moral sense of community. Universal domain ensures that all possible combinations of individual orderings can be considered. One point to this condition is
to avoid manipulation of preferences. The attempt fails , of course. Even
with universal domain the theorem, and its many successors,
demonstrates that manipulation is possible; for outcomes are not independent of the paths to them. But the attempt is senseless if moral
agents are not the victims of manipulation . Pareto follows the same
logic . The nonperverse expression of unanimity in outcomes is empty
as a purely mathematical condition. It does not bear on the social
representation of the theorem. Pareto, as a moral concept, guarantees
that the unanimous preferences of reasoning agents will be fulfilled at
the collective level. Moral agency is in general needed to establish the
equity conditions in the absence of which the rational problem of Arrow's theorem does not occur.

A

community of moral agents , whatever else it is, consists of individuals who self-legislate, ordering alternatives on reasons .
This is a moral condition of liberalism . Such a community
is not consistent with an arithmetical community . Prescription is a
feature of all reasons. A reason to do a rather than some rival alternative is a rational appeal for all to do a. A reason for an action prescribes
for a class of relevantly similar agents, never just for a particular person
or situation. Moral agents are thus never entirely distinct units but always
have normative effects on each other by means of the reasons employed
for orderings. A moral accord is based on reasoned argument, not aggregation. And reasoned deliberations permit emergent values. For example, a juridical proceeding, one device to accommodate reasoned
orderings, is normally seen as defective unless (a) individuals are viewed
not as discrete units but as members of classes, (b) outcomes are produced from rational deliberation rather than arithmetical combinations,
and (c) decisions can establish new precedents from conventional rules
and evidence . The second sense of a community, also present in Arrow's theorem, is holistic rather than numerical, in the sense that individuals are constituent members of social practices established on
shared values and that collective outcomes can routinely produce
emergent values.
The problem is that the theorem contains no device to express this

https://surface.syr.edu/suscholar/vol6/iss1/2
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second community. Rawls's theory of justice uses the OP to represent
a moral community. Rational agents are transformed into moral agents,
choosing for everyone, by the veil of ignorance. But unlike Rawls 's
theory, Arrow's theorem has no filter (like the OP) to mediate between
the disjointedness of the liberal model and collective outcomes. Collective outcomes are instead produced directly by aggregating the
separate preferences of discrete individuals. This uninterrupted transformation fails to be completed . One or more of the features of liberalism
conflict with each other. The equality engraved in Arrow's theorem by
logical contagion never leads to a warranted inequality . All dominance
is therefore unjustified . Rawls's theory, in contrast, justifies distributions that (in complex ways) favor the worst-off representative person.
The OP uses equality as the basis for justifying inequalities. The force
and elegance of this hypothetical condition can be appreciated anew.
The absence of such a mediating device in Arrow's theorem aggravates
the natural tensions in liberal societies between equality and inequality or, more broadly, between arithmetical and moral needs. Aggregation and the moral conditions of liberalism are articulated throughout
Arrow 's theorem, with no instrument to render them consistent with
each other. There is no reason to think that anything resembling an
OP would resolve Arrow's problem . But the impossibility result is a
failure of consistency between aggregation and morality that Rawls's
theory, whatever its liabilities, avoids.

Exchange theory

2 5. Theories of the market
routinely use a number of other
defining conditions but rarely
agree on them. Neoclassical
economics, e.g., develops markers on
perfect information, while the
tradition identified with Ludwig
von Mises, in Human Action-a
Treatise on Economics (London:
Hodge, 1949), abandons conditions of perfect information. I
know of no theory of the market,
however, that does not contain as
a core concept the minimalist
definition I offer here.
26. Douglas Rae, "An Altimeter
for Mr. Escher's Stairway: A Comment on William H. Riker 's 'Implications from the Disequilibrium
of Majority Rule for the Study of
Institutions,'" American Political
Science Review 74 Oune 1980):
4 51-55. Rae views the altimeter of
neoclassical markets as a device
" to underwrite the rights-utility
bond" in liberal thought.
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The liberal community of rational and autonomous moral agents
ts prominently displayed in exchange theory . Arrow's theorem
demonstrates that separate and countable individuals cannot be joined
arithmetically to produce collective outcomes meeting simultaneous tests
of rationality and equity. The same type of problem occurs in markets,
where again efforts to map a collective outcome from discrete individuals
fail to fulfill the moral and rational expectations of liberalism .
Let a market be defined as a collection of exchanges. 25 A thought
experiment can identify the range of problems both addressed and raised
by exchange theory. Think of two rational individuals each with a supply
of goods which they freely exchange (for whatever reason, though
presumably each benefits). The first thing to notice in the exchange
is that transitivity seems to be maintained through the fulfillment of
Pareto. Since, in a free exchange, everyone is better off than before
the exchange (or some are better off and no one is worse off), a handy
altimeter is provided. Each successive social state, if brought about by
exchange, must be "higher" (better) than its antecedent. The cycle
of cyclical majorities, or the general failure of transitive orderings, is
thus avoided. If A (exchange state 1) > B (exchange state 2), and B
> C (exchange state 3), then with the altimeter of Pareto, A > C. 26
The two individuals may also believe that they avoid the other failures
of collective action prominently displayed in various theorems and
proofs. Certainly, their preferences are transformed without interruption into collective outcomes. Each individual gets exactly what he
prefers in an ideal exchange. Equity tests also seem to be met by the
condition of liberty found in exchanges. If individuals are truly free
to exchange goods, nondictatorship is realized. The liberal model of
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a political community is maintained by introducing its defining features
directly into an idealized view of markets.
But the requirements of liberalism are not met in market institutions. Theories about institutions can be criticized from two standpoints.
One might say that, as applied to reality, they have (logically, empirically) anomalous or contradictory implications. Such a critique of Plato's
Republic, for example, would concentrate on the general problems of
implementation and the effects of partial implementation on one or
another of the state's features (what happens, say, to the ideal status
of the arrangements if one part fails-no common property for the upper guardians-and all other parts are intact). A second line of criticism
might concentrate on the theory as an ideal and trace out problems
and inconsistencies in terms of its internal logic. Both lines have been
developed in the literature on exchange. An inspection of this literature
will suggest (a) how markets, like aggregation machines, fail tests of
rationality and equity, and (b) what changes in the general concepts
of collective choice might be needed to avoid these failures.

T

he failures of markets, however, must also be measured against
our expectations. An especially optimistic and persuasive case for
the rationality and fairness of exchange is drawn up by Robert
Nozick in his Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Nozick's account is important in several ways, not least because the moral community fixed at
the background level in Rawls's theory of justice and in Arrow's theorem
is an explicit and richly described society in Nozick's story of justice.
We are asked to imagine a collection of separate and rational individuals
in conditions of no authority (a state of nature). Lockean problems occur in these conditions, primarily overestimations of harm that lead to
excessive retributions and an endless series of retaliations. Mutual protection associations develop to address these problems. Eventually, a
dominant association emerges that provides protection to all who pay
for its services.
The state-like entity providing protection to its clients is limited by
the moral endowments of individuals in conditions of no authority.
Nozick sugggests a hyperplane of moral space around each individual
which can be crossed only if the individual consents. (If the state must
cross such a moral border in protecting its clients, compensation must
be paid to the individual.) Indeed, the unauthorized crossings in the
state of nature are precisely what occasion protection associations. The
moral status of individuals-separate from each other and with rights
to pursue their own goals without interference from others-is
unchanged when authority is established. Limitations on state authority
are thus set by the premised moral features. The state cannot redistribute
resources but only carry out the protective functions for which it was
created.
The contrasts between such a limited state and interventionist accounts of authority are well known. 27 Collective distributions are just
on Nozick's theory if the individuals are entitled to their shares of the
collective product, not if the distribution satisfies some time-slice principle that is indifferent to the way the distribution occurs (e.g., Rawls's
difference principle). Put simply, a distribution is just on Nozick's tests
if it arises from another just distribution by legitimate means (prior steps
that are just). Legitimacy in this case follows the pattern set by the
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27. Among the fine anthologies
elaborating and criticizing Nozick's
theory is the issue of Arizona Law
Review devoted to a symposium
on Anarchy, State , and Utopia
(vol. 19 , no . 1 [ 1977]).
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original moral community. Liberty must be maintained in the acquisition and transfer of holdings; and liberty, according to Nozick, is best
secured through local exchanges of goods. The liberal model of discrete
and autonomous individuals is maintained consistently throughout the
theory of justice that Nozick develops by accepting only those social
conditions-in particular exchange-that do not affect its defining
features .

B

28. See, respectively, the entry on
"power" by Robert Dahl in International Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciencies (New York: Macmillan,
1968); by Quentin Gibson in
Philosophy of Social Science 1
(1971): 101-12; and by Stanley
Benn in Encyclopedia of
Phtlosophy, ed. Paul Edwards
(New York: Macmillan, 1967).
29. E.g., James March, " An Introduction to the Theory and
Measurement of Influence,''
American Political Science Review
49 Oune 1955): 431-51; Robert
Dahl, "power"; Jack Nagel, The
Descriptive Analysis of Power
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1975).
30. The first recognition of
"ecological" power was, so far as I
know , by Dorwin Carrwright, "Influence, Leadership, Control," in
Handbook of Organizations, ed.
James March (Chicago: Rand
McNally, 1965), pp. 1-41.
31. See Harry Eckstein, "Authority
Patterns: A Structural Basis for
Political Inquiry, " American
Political Science Review 67
(December 1973): 1142-61, for a
slightly different rendition .

32. For a review of recent
literature (and some helpful contributions to it), see David
Baldwin , "Power and Social Exchange ," American Political
Science Review 72 (December
1978): 1229-42 .
33. Baldwin , "Power and Social
Exchange"; Felix Oppenheim,
" 'Power' Revisited, " journal of
Politics 40 (1978): 589-608.
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ut exchange fares no better in maintaining the liberal model
than aggregation does . Even the basic distinctions between power
and exchange on which market justice is developed cannot always
be drawn clearly . Power is an unreasonably complex term. It can be
expressed as an actual occurrence, an ability, and the successful achievement of intended results, among other things . 28 When distinguished
from exchange transactions, the asymmetry of power is seized by
analogy: "A has power over B" is like "A causes B" to do something,
where the flow is in one direction, A to B. (If A has power over I causes
B to do a, then B does not have power over/cause A to do a). 29 Power
is also unlike exchange in its capacity to be assigned to environmental
or ecological control, whereby A can effectively get B to do a by affecting some set of conditions, c, without any communication or direct contact with B, or A-C-B (a).30
An exchange transaction is, in contrast, a relation between A and
B characterized by a transfer of items (goods, behaviors, etc.). The
customer buying a dozen eggs with ready cash has engaged in a social
exchange characterized by a medium of general value (money). When
set apart from "power," the symmetrical nature of exchange is stressed:
equity in outcome, volition, and effect is characteristic of social exchange. The flow of action is reciprocal, from A to B and B to A.
Economics is frequently said to be concerned with social exchanges,
politics with power relations-a division of labor assumed on distinctions between the two types of events_31
Critics, however, have pointed out a rich area of overlap between
power and exchange . In general, each concept seems robust enough
to include almost all members of the other: (a) Coercion (or negative
sanctions), long a defining component of power, can successfully be
viewed as a feature of social exchange in which B does a in order to
avoid sanctions (in other words, he exchanges his behavior for the nonoccurrence of the sanction) . (b) The nonvolitional nature of power, in
which the respondent acts against his will (preferences, interests), is
uninterpreted in the absence of opportunity costs. Thus the provision
of sufficient rewards can at once get B to do a against his will and also
complete an exchange transaction. (c) An imbalance in outcome, volition, or effect can also be found in social exchanges; for an exchange
unfavorable to one or some of the parties (non-Pareto in outcome) is
still nonetheless an exchange. 32 Or, power can be viewed successfully
as an exchange, and exchange looks remarkably like power. One intriguing effort to transform exchange to power fragments exchange into
a series of power relations: (a) A gets B to do j (hand over a dozen eggs),
and (b) B gets A to do k (hand over the ready cash), with A and B
each occupying (temporarily) the role of power authority vs.
respondent. 33
The only clear distinction between the two concepts might be drawn
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up on differences between actions that are direct (individuals act on
each other) and those that are oblique (individuals act on attendant
conditions or collateral agents). Authorities who control through positive
or negative sanctions are exercising power in a direct fashion. When
control is consummated by restricting the agenda of choices or by failing to make decisions for alternative social arrangements, power is
oblique-and thus distinct from exchange .3 4 Note that the condition
of universal domain-one guarantee that agendas will not be controlled
by authorities-is embedded in a satisfactory definition of liberty. 35 So
to the degree that exchanges fulfill liberty, oblique power will be excluded from exchange. But direct forms of power are less easily demarcated from exchange.

S

uppose, however, that the critics can be satisfied with criteria
demarcating exchange from power. Even then the concept of
exchange falters in decisive ways on a settlement of the rational
problems surveyed here . Imagine now in the thought experiment that
a third party, though not involved directly in the exchange, is part of
the social practice of exchange between the first two individuals. Suppose also that the exchange results in a loss to this third individual ,
that some of the costs of the transaction are passed off to him . Then
Pareto is an illusion, maintained only by ignoring the external effects
of an exchange . And transitivity is lost when the wider effects of exchange are calculated. Shifting costs to those outside a transaction is
a violation of equity however conceived (since the "outsiders" are
neither responsible for, nor benefit from, the exchange). But the rational point is more important: a comprehensive perspective on exchange
can deny one of the principles-Pareto-that justifies exchange as
superior to power or authority. The altimeter that cyclical majorities
deny in majority rule is also , when externalities occur, missing in
exchange. 36
Nor is coordination among individuals guaranteed in exchanges . Experimental efforts at institution building in game theory frequently use
bargaining and side payments-the introduction of exchange-as a solution to coordination problems. Let a simple case be part of the thought
experiment on exchange . Two individuals consider alternatives a and
b. Let each individual assign a utility to the alternatives, represented
by the integers below.

b

a

1

10

0

2

0

10

A Prisoners' Dilemma game occurs with advantage going to the player
whose preferred alternative is considered first . Since exchange depends
on the realization of a and b, the conditions for successful exchange
may be exactly those avoiding coordination and assurance dilemmas:
either (1) a cohesive social unit established by stable players; repetitive
alternatives; a continuing framework of rewards and penalties; small,
face-to-face social relations, and so on;3 7 or (2) an external guarantee
of compliance with agreements (e .g. , the coercive state , long accepted
as the guarantor of property rights and contracts) . Exchange theory, in

https://surface.syr.edu/suscholar/vol6/iss1/2

34. Peter Bachrach and Morton
Baratz , " Two Faces of Power,"
Amen-can Political Science Review
56 (December 1962): 947 - 52.
35. Universal domain ensures only
negative liberty, or the absence of
obstacles to free choice. No condition in the theorem guarantees or
even refers to positive liberty ,
which requires the provision of
those conditions in the absence of
which effective liberty is impossible. I refer here to Isaiah Berlin's
famous distinction in Two Concepts of Liberty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958) and Four Essays
on Liberty (New York: Oxford
University Press , 1969). See also
the synthesis of negative and
positive liberty by means of the
concept of "constraint," in Gerald
MacCullum , "Negative and
Positive Liberty ," in Contemporary
Political Theory , ed. Alan de
Crespigny and Alan Wertheimer
(New York: Atherton, 1970) . The
theorem 's concentration on
negative liberty indicates yet again
the liberal view that individual
autonomy depends on noninterference. The possibility that a
different , and perhaps more
robust, sense of autonomy occurs
in communal arrangements,
especially those guaranteed by the
state, is simply never considered.
36. William H . Riker and Steven J.
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Science Review 67 (December
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others treated here , is vast. See,
e.g., Thomas Schwartz, "Vote
Trading and Pareto Efficiency,"
Public Choice 24 (1975): 101 - 10,
for one among several qualifications to the claim that externalities
can make everyone worse off in exchange (in this case , vote trading) .

37. Peter Bernholz , " Prisoners'
Dilemma , Logrolling and Cyclical
Group Preferences," Public Choice
29 (Spring 1977): 73-84.
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38. This is a well-known critique
of Nozick's main argument in
Anarchy, State, and Utopia. The
recent discussion of vote trading in
Riker, Liberalism against Populism,
pp. 15 7-6 7, establishes in more
general ways that exchange will
not avoid composition fallacies.
See also the discussion of market
disequilibria by Norman Schofield,
"Instability and Development in
the Political Economy," in
Political Equilibrium, ed. Peter C.
Ordeshook and Kenneth A. Shepsle (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff,
1982).

39. This last point is an irresistible
observation on the empirical
operation of markets that is much
disputed in the literature. The
conceptual point, however, is indisputable: liberty in exchange is
strongly conditioned by the prior
distribution of property rights, and
no continuing system of exchange
can guarantee equity in the
distribution of property. Indeed,
markets provide no criteria for the
normative task of assigning property rights, which nonetheless is
required prior to the operations of
the market. An especially helpful
discussion of these points is
Charles Lindblom's Politics and
Markets (New York: Basic Books,
1977). See also the nice summary
in Charles Schultze , The Public
Use of Private Interest
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1977).
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short, does not so much solve problems of coordination as restate the
conditions needed for a solution.
If we maintain in the thought experiment the image of numerous
individuals exchanging goods to be aggregated into a collective outcome, another version of the fallacy of composition can occur with exchanges . A decision to exchange items in individual transactions is not
equivalent to, or the condition for the derivation of, a preference for
the distribution resulting from the aggregated transactions. Professors
can consistently (a) choose to pay $10 to see their favorite soccer team
play, while (b) not preferring the inequitable distributions of moneys
to star players that result (e.g., $1 million per year salaries). Champions of the market (like Nozick) inevitably point out that a modification of the aggregate distribution will restrict the liberty of individuals
to dispose of, and accumulate, their resources as they wish. But this
observation does not touch the point on rationality: that what is rational for the individual in single transactions can be irrational for the
individual in aggregate form.38
What does touch on liberty, however, is a widely-held point on the
empirical operation of markets . Exchange transactions are notorious for
producing inequitable distributions of resources. Even the most cursory glance at the operations of the free market will reveal enormously
unequal distributions. Again, however, the logic of exchange suggests
why unequal patterns are possible. Repeating an exchange over time
while maintaining liberty provides no check on the pattern of resource
distribution. Outcomes can, and empirically do, result in unequal accumulations. And unequal outcomes affect the premises of exchange.
Full freedom to exchange goods depends in the most obvious ways on
equality of starting resources . If individual 1 is wealthy, individual 2
not, it is a matter of little dispute that coercive results are both possible
and likely. And if dictators, those who dominate others on the
disproportionate accumulation of wealth, are the products of free
markets as well as of political institutions, exchange cannot be a solution to the equity problems of collective choice. 39

T

hese brief points on markets are of course compressed critiques
of a complex set of theories. To be reasonable, they have to be
joined to empirical studies of the market, and, of course,
expanded . Even in compressed form, however, they state what only
blind advocates of the market can deny: that markets do not fulfill the
rational and moral criteria drawn from the liberal model on which they
are developed Markets may ( 1) fail to transform preferences into collective outcomes (assurance and coordination failures can occur) and
(2) fail both consistency tests (the fallacy of composition holds for
markets as well as for aggregation devices) and equity criteria (Pareto
and nondictatorship) . Markets, in short, seem as vulnerable to rational
and moral breakdowns as aggregation machines and so are members
of that species of rational problem represented by Prisoners' Dilemma
and Arrow's theorem. It is important to note that market failures occur because there is no feature of exchange that will guarantee the conditions set out by the rational and moral criteria of collective choice
theory. The logic of exchange, though altering several of the conditions found in collective choice (successfully substituting, for example,
various cardinal scales for Arrow's orderings), still permits rational
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breakdowns between liberal premises and collective outcomes.
The failure of markets, moreover, is due to the same conflict between
arithmetical and moral languages found in Arrow's theorem. Nozick's
unexamined assumption is that individuals are self-legislating creatures.
Yet markets provide no institutional arrangements to address individual
claims or justify aggregate outcomes. Like aggregation machines, markets
accept only reasonless entries, and market outcomes are ungoverned
collections of such entries. The absence of reasons has a double edge
in exchange theory. On the one hand, there are advantages. Exchange
is effective in reaching joint outcomes in large measure because shared
reasons are not required to reach an agreement. (Even the definition
of a gain or loss can vary with each individual in an exchange.) Outcomes satisfactory to all parties that leave intact the variety of reasons
contributing to dispute are obviously less demanding than those requiring an agreement on reasons. Indeed, to demand that each individual
in an exchange agree on reasons may be pathological, rupturing the
selective compromise distinctive of exchange. A Pareto optimal outcome can be reached with each individual having a different reason to
support the outcome.
On the other hand, the absence of reasons makes rational agreement
difficult, perhaps impossible, on a number of issues. If reasons are entirely excluded from settlements among individuals, those issues requiring a reasoned resolution-such as moral issues-cannot be included
in such settlements. 40 This limitation is generally recognized in the use
of exchange . In ordinary language, items are sometimes "priceless."
One import of such thoughts is that certain goods are regularly excluded
from the marketplace. Children, it is frequently noted, are not bought
and sold as exchange commodities. They are allocated, when allocation is needed, on reasoned grounds by adoption agencies. Although
the items uncomfortable with exchange settlements vary with conventions, those items with moral status resist market transactions (moral
language requiring reasoned orderings). Thus life-maintenance items
and basic rights are often outside the pale of exchange in Western
societies. Technical resolutions also, since they require reasoned outcomes, cannot be settled by exchange. The limited usefulness of exchange as an instrument to resolve moral and technical issues is the
natural consequence of reasonless orderings. And these limitations
restrict the capacity of markets to represent that liberal community of
reason-giving individuals that provides rational and moral criteria in
collective choice for evaluating institutions.

40. An idea expressed first (and
best) by Marx. See, e.g., the lovely
phrases in the opening pages of
"Needs, Production, and Division
of Labor, " in Karl Marx: Early
Writings, ed. T. B. Bottomore
(New York: McGraw-Hill , 1964).
See also the classic study by
Charles Titmuss, The Gift Relationship (London: Allen & Unwin,
1971 ). The tradition of excluding
items from markets on moral
grounds is long and varied. Even
libertarians join in. Mill, in On
Liberty, rules out slavery as a
possible outcome from exchange.

T

he limitations of exchange are generally recognized in the
development of regulating devices that meet liberal tests.
Dworkin, for example, introduces the liberal model in order to
elaborate theories of equality. 41 A hypothetical collection of immigrants (rational, autonomous, and discrete individuals) is faced with
the problem of distributing bundles of resources among themselves.
A distribution is equal if no one prefers anyone else's bundle of resources
to his own. An auction is the device that Dworkin suggests to effect
an equal distribution of resources: prices are set so that all lots (resources)
clear the market (there is only one purchaser). The auction addresses
the problem of dissatisfaction with resource bundles due to different
tastes or needs by distributing each lot in terms of how important the
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41. Ronald Dworkin, "What Is
Equality? " pes. 1 and 2,
Phzlosophy and Public Affairs 10
(Summer 1981): 185 - 246.
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resource bundle is to all individuals in the community. The auction
thus assigns importance to each individual preference by comparing it
to all other preferences.
Unequal talents require additional devices, however. Nozick' s
noninterventionist state must permit any inequality that might follow
from the initial conditions of equality. Dworkin also allows inequality
in the distribution of resources. But, unlike minimal-state theories,
Dworkin's account requires that inequalities be ambition sensitive (in
reflecting industry, effort) but not endowment sensitive (luck, genetics).
The state must permit the first type of inequality and compensate for
the second. The device used to reestablish a distributive balance is the
progressive income tax at rates set by a hypothetical insurance market.
Suppose each individual knows his own talents and the income distribution but not his location on the distributive matrix. He can then choose
an income level and pay the premium set for that level. The insurance
would then pay the difference between the actual and chosen income
levels. Devices such as these are designed to compensate for unequal
distributions of talent without penalizing unequal expenditures of effort. Nozick's star athlete (Wilt Chamberlin) will in this way be taxed
progressively at rates deemed fair by a theory that marks off warranted
and unwarranted inequalities.
An inspection of exchange tells us that, as with aggregation, additional devices must be introduced if the moral features of liberalism
are to be successfully represented in institutions. If the liberal model
is interpreted simply in terms of numerical units, integers to be
arithmetically combined, nothing compels us to compensate for inequalities. But the liberal community of moral agents in a hypothetical
setting of autonomy both guides and justifies the combination rules
designed to extend liberalism to institutional forms. The transformation by markets is incomplete without regulating devices to ensure that
the moral conditions of the hypothetical community are realized in the
actual conditions of society.

Models of a political society
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A general view of aggregation and exchange submits this to our
understanding: that the surface and background assumptions of collective choice fail to generate an arrangement of individual parts that
is comprehensible in terms of the assumptions.
The failure of the assumptions is traceable to a basic incompatibility
between moral and arithmetical languages. A liberal model of society
is a background assumption in Rawls's theory of justice and Arrow's
theorem, a foreground description in Nozick's market version of justice.
This liberal model sets out certain moral conditions that are to be
fulfilled in collective outcomes, but these conditions cannot be fulfilled
with the use of arithmetical composition rules. The moral language of
Arrow's problem surfaces in conflicts between rationality and equity.
Arrow's dictator, for example, satisfies the requirements of rationality
as set out in the conditions of the theorem. (Indeed, decisive or dominant individuals violate no rule of rationality known to collective choice
theory.) Equity, however, is offended by dictatorship or exploitation.
As we have seen, the rejection of decisive individuals requires that no
individual override any other on any preference ordering; and this
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avoidance of inequality in all areas of collective choice requires that individuals be absolutely equal. No collective outcome can then be
generated without violating at least one of the theorem's other conditions . The starting point for this eventual paralysis is the same liberal
model of morally autonomous individuals that leads to the failures of
exchange .
The moral conditions of liberalism seem to be incompatible with any
procedural or technical effort to forge social institutions. Imagine two
individuals. Now (a) combine by counting some set of values discovered
or ascribed to the two individuals, or (b) witness the two individuals
transferring a unit of value . Suppose that either event starts and stops
with the physicalist fact (a description of aggregation or transfer).
Nothing can be inferred from the physicalist fact that will establish moral
and rational criteria. The individuals might be machines, the action
a mechanical process. Now imagine that the two individuals have been
invested with moral and rational qualities (they are autonomous; they
feel , suffer, think, calculate; they are moral equals). Neither aggregation nor exchange has the capacity to address the claims (reasoned
preferences) these individuals might make on the outcomes of their joint
actions or even on the practices within which their actions occur. Both
aggregation and exchange fail moral and rational tests because each is
a numerical form of interaction and the tests are drawn from moral conceptions of human life. The conflicts in each case occur between counting rules, emergent outcomes, and the moral conditions of a liberal
community.

I

t is a truism that all theories depend on assumptions. It is another
truism, though a more profound one, that there are two models
of a political society that order and interpret even the most basic
of assumptions: one is holistic, the other arithmetical. Aristotle, developing his political theory on holistic terms, fuses items that arithmetical
models maintain as separate: individual, state, society. One consequence
of this fusion is that a number of concepts and theories characterizing
liberal and libertarian political theory cannot be developed on the
Aristotelian version of the polis . Among these are individual rights,
anarchism, and civil disobedience-each of which requires an adversary relationship between the individual and society that is impossible
to conceive in Aristotle's political society. Hobbes, in contrast, separates
individual, state, and society on a more nearly numerical model of
association. From this separation follow theories of individual rights,
the intelligibility (though not rationality) of anarchism, and the possibility of civil disobedience.
Concepts change their sense from one model to the other. Liberty,
for example, is a communal fulfillment in Aristotle, a negative freedom
from state regulation in Hobbes. But the stronger effect of the two
models on political thought is seen in the realization that some concepts exist only in terms of one or the other model. Anarchism, for
example, is not rejected by Aristotle (as it is by Hobbes) . The question
asked by Hobbes, Ought there to be any authority? is simply excluded
on the conditions of Aristotle's political theory. Anarchism is literally
unintelligible on Aristotle's organic model of civil society.
The contradictions of aggregation and exchange are more fully
understood if framed in terms of a conflict within liberalism between
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the holistic needs of morality and the discrete logic of arithmetical
languages . The liberal model accepts individuals as separate and countable units , yet endows them with moral features that are more comfortably elaborated in holistic political theories. The failures of collective
choice represented by Arrow's theorem and exchange theory are the
result of contradictions within liberal theory . These contradictions are
produced because there is no mediating device to transform the disjointed features of liberalism into the type of moral community
liberalism seeks. The analysis of background concepts tells us in general
that the formal terms and conditions of collective choice do not cut
deeply enough, and that there is another layer of conflict where theories
with competing needs (in this case, liberalism) must be amended to
produce noncontradictory collective outcomes.
Perhaps the original flaw in liberalism is that it is best elaborated
as a series of shields that insulate individuals from collective regulation. Certainly the failures of aggregation and exchange testify to the
difficulty of extending the hypothetical community of moral agents into
the area of social practice . Yet the very minimalism of these two combining forms, which at first thought seems congenial with liberal communities, is the source of failure. Neither form is robust enough to express the moral and rational criteria that liberalism seems to require.
More substantial structures are needed to move the liberal assumptions
in collective choice to the explicit level of a rational political society.
It is important to see the problems of aggregation and exchange as
a conflict between two different kinds of languages in order to recognize
those institutions that do meet liberal needs. MacKay, for example, views
Arrow's theorem as an infinite regress paradox requiring a familiar
resolution: introduce a first cause, in this case a dismissal of unlimited
scope through a restriction on the pattern of preferences. 42 Since it is
well known that single-peaked preferences avoid cyclical majorities, 4 3
transitivity can be achieved and the paradox dissolved. But if the
breakdowns originate in background moral expectations, unlimited
scope cannot be dismissed without first in some way preserving
autonomy, one of the features of moral agency that creates the problem in the first place. The identification of background assumptions
tells us that some reconstruction of basic concepts is needed for a satisfactory solution to the problems of collective choice. The prime candidates
seem to be the concept of rationality, the primitive term ''individual''
(currently both a count noun and a holistic unit in collective choice),
and the composition rules producing collective outcomes. Or, put in
more unsettling language, the rational breakdowns between individual
and society elaborated in collective choice may force us to paradigmlevel changes in political theory.
Appendix 1
The original version of Newcomb's problem was first described by Robert
Nozick in his "Newcomb's Problem and Two Principles of Choice,"
in Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel, ed. Nicholas Rescher (Dordrecht:
Reidel, 1969). See also Martin Gardner's column, "Mathematical
Games," in Scientific Amen'can 230 (March 1974): 102-9. In the problem, an individual faces two opaque boxes. In one box there is always
$1,000. In the second box there is either $1 million or nothing. A
superior being places the $1 million in the second box if he correctly
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predicts that the actor will choose only the second box (choice A). The
being does not place the $1 million if he predicts that the individual
will choose both boxes (choice B). Should the individual choose A or
B? Newcomb's problem is a conflict between expected utility (EU) and
dominance (D) in making the choice of A or B.
(a) On EU: Assuming a probability of 1 for the being's correct predictions, then A = [1 X $1,000,000] + (0 X OJ = $1,000,000 ; and B
= (OX$1,000,000] + (1X$1,000] = $1,000.0ncertaintyofprediction, EU = A > B (choose only the second box). Note that even with
a successful prediction rate as low as . 5005, EU still produces A > B.
(b) On D: Taking only one box has outcomes of $1 or $0. Taking
both boxes has outcomes of $1 ,001,000 or $1,000 . The money is either
in the second box or not. In either case , the choice of both boxes leads
to results superior to those of taking only one box.
Embellishment for dominance principle : Imagine a friendly observer
behind the boxes, able to see into them. Whether the second box is
empty or stuffed with $1 million, the friend would urge the actor to
take both boxes; for $1,001,000 > $1,000 ,000 and $1,000 > $0.
Dominance requires B > A.
Appendix 2
Let the following definitions be accepted as Arrow's meanings:
Decisiveness: A set of individuals is decisive for x against y (x, y E X,
where X = a set of mutually exclusive alternatives) if, for every profile
u in which ( 1) x ~ 1 y for all i E s; ( 2) x ~ i y for at least one i E
s; we have X E v (where v = a nonempty subset of X) = > y ~ Cu (v)
(or, y is excluded from the choice function, Cu, over the agendas, v) .
Put in looser language, if xis in the agenda , y will not be chosen .
Decisiveness is thus an exclusionary power.

Pareto: For all distinct x, y E X, the set of all n (where n
of individuals) is decisive for x against y.

= the number

Nondictatorship: There is no one individual who alone is decisive for
x against y for all distinct x, y E X.
Universal domain: (1) The domain of/consists of all logically possible
profiles , u (roughly, orderings of alternatives). (2) At every u, the domain of Cu = f(u) includes all finite nonempty subsets of X. If u =
a logically possible profile and v E X, vis finite and v f= (J, Cu (v) i= ~·
Or, the domain is unrestricted in the sense that every logically possible combination of individual orderings of alternatives in X must be
the domain of the social choice function.
Independence of irrelevant alternatives: Let u and u ' be two distinct
profiles whose restriction to v are the same. Iff assigns choice function
Cu to profile u and Cu ' to u ' , then Cu (v) = Cu ' (v) .
Completeness : x Ru y or y Ru x for all x, y .
Transitivity: x Ru y and y Ru z

=>

x Ru z.

Rationality : For every profile u, Cu has a binary relation Ru such that
Cu can be explained by Ru as Cu (v) = [x E v (X Ru for ally E v)] .
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